Identifica y ataca los flancos débiles de tus oponentes: Estrategia de la Vuelta

EXPOSE AND ATTACK YOUR
OPPONENT'S SOFT FLANK
THE TURNING STRATEGY

When you attack people directly, you stiffen their
resistance and make your task that much harder.
There is a better way: distract your opponents'
attention to the front, then attack them from the side,
where they least expect it. By hitting them where they
are soft, tender, and unprotected, you create a
shock, a moment of weakness for you to exploit. Bait
people into going out on a limb, exposing their
weakness, then rake them with fire from the side.
The only way to get stubborn opponents to move is
to approach them indirectly.
Robert Greene

The Emperor [Napoleon Bonaparte] , while he
was quite prepared "to break eggs to make
omelettes," as von Clausewitz puts it, was
always eager to gain total victory for a minimum
expenditure of manpower and effort.
Consequently he disliked having to force a fullscale,
fully arrayed frontal battle--that is to say,
marching directly against the enemy to fight
him on ground of his (the adversary's)
choosing, for such battles were inevitably
expensive and rarely conclusive (Borodino in
1812 is a case in point). Instead, whenever
possible, after pinning the foe frontally by a feint
attack, he marched his main army by the
quickest possible "safe" route, hidden by the
cavalry screen and natural obstacles, to place
himself on the rear or flank of his opponent.
Once this move had been successfully
achieved, he occupied a natural barrier or
"strategical curtain" (usually a river line or
mountain range), ordered the blocking of all
crossings, and thus isolated his intended victim
from his rear depots and reduced his chances
of reinforcement. Thereafter, Napoleon
advanced relentlessly toward the foe's army,
offering him only two alternatives--to fight for
survival on ground not of his own choosing, or to
surrender. The advantages afforded by such a
strategy are obvious. The enemy army would be
both taken by surprise and almost certainly
demoralized by the sudden apparition of the
enemy army in its rear, cutting its
communications.
THE CAMPAIGNS OF NAPOLEON, 
DAVID G. CHANDLER, 1966